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ABSTRACT
....................................................................................................................................................
Objective We describe use cases and an institutional reference architecture for maintaining high-capacity, data-intensive network flows (e.g., 10,
40, 100 Gbpsþ) in a scientific, medical context while still adhering to security and privacy laws and regulations.
Materials and Methods High-end networking, packet filter firewalls, network intrusion detection systems.
Results We describe a “Medical Science DMZ” concept as an option for secure, high-volume transport of large, sensitive data sets between re-
search institutions over national research networks.
Discussion The exponentially increasing amounts of “omics” data, the rapid increase of high-quality imaging, and other rapidly growing clinical
data sets have resulted in the rise of biomedical research “big data.” The storage, analysis, and network resources required to process these data
and integrate them into patient diagnoses and treatments have grown to scales that strain the capabilities of academic health centers. Some data
are not generated locally and cannot be sustained locally, and shared data repositories such as those provided by the National Library of Medicine,
the National Cancer Institute, and international partners such as the European Bioinformatics Institute are rapidly growing. The ability to store and
compute using these data must therefore be addressed by a combination of local, national, and industry resources that exchange large data sets.
Maintaining data-intensive flows that comply with HIPAA and other regulations presents a new challenge for biomedical research. Recognizing
this, we describe a strategy that marries performance and security by borrowing from and redefining the concept of a “Science DMZ”—a frame-
work that is used in physical sciences and engineering research to manage high-capacity data flows.
Conclusion By implementing a Medical Science DMZ architecture, biomedical researchers can leverage the scale provided by high-performance
computer and cloud storage facilities and national high-speed research networks while preserving privacy and meeting regulatory requirements.
....................................................................................................................................................
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INTRODUCTION
With a national commitment to precision medicine,1 medical science is
quickly moving into the realm of “big data.”2 Storage, computation,
and transfer needs to process these data are growing rapidly in medical
schools, outstripping the capacity of on-premise IT resources. Precision
medicine will require participation in a national federation of interlinked
data repositories and high-performance computing (HPC), cloud com-
puting, and storage facilities that will serve biomedical researchers and
ultimately care providers. Data generated by increasingly high through-
put and increasingly distributed sequencers and imaging facilities will
need to be integrated with rapidly expanding national repositories of
reference data such as The Cancer Genome Atlas. Any precision medi-
cine effort will need to combine locally managed data, distributed refer-
ence data, and local and national computational services.
The National Institutes of Health are spearheading a “Commons
Initiative” for data sharing, and have long provided reference data
through the National Library of Medicine. The National Cancer
Institute is pursuing 3 cloud pilots for cancer genomics.3 National
HPC facilities are applying their capacity to biomedical research.
These efforts are interconnected by high-capacity research networks
such as the Internet2 and ESnet. These networks are part of the
so-called Research and Education (R&E) network ecosystem, which
provides high-performance networks designed specifically for large-
scale science and engineering data to interconnect research
institutions globally. Academic computing resources connected to
R&E networks have traditionally been leveraged for applications at
scale such as high-energy physics research (e.g., the Large Hadron
Collider experiments, which use the Open Science Grid4), astronomy,
climate modeling, and other “big science” initiatives that compute at
the PetaFLOPS scale. Protecting patient privacy has not, however,
traditionally been part of the equation in high-performance comput-
ing. Many organizations, such as the Coalition for Advanced
Scientific Computing, are helping HPC centers meet HIPAA and
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH) requirements in response to this need.
In order for precision medicine and other Big Data health care re-
search strategies to be successful, there must be a national strategy
for the secure transfer of patient data at scale. The key control points
for these data at each institution are firewalls that inspect network
traffic, secure sensitive data, and mitigate risks. A de facto technical
control in environments subject to regulations such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule5 is
to employ commercial firewalls. However, a significant tension exists
between the standards that reference firewalls for sensitive data6 and
the performance requirements needed for data-intensive science.
A “Science DMZ” is a portion of the network at the local network pe-
rimeter of an individual research institution that is designed such that the
equipment, configuration, and security policies are optimized for high-
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performance workflows and large data sets.5,6 A Science DMZ is typically
connected to an R&E network at high speed to allow the resources in the
local Science DMZ to connect to other Science DMZs with the perfor-
mance necessary to support large-scale data-intensive science. The
Science DMZ architecture also maintains the security of the data through
a number of distinct techniques, but does not employ commercial fire-
walls due to their inadequate performance. The basic Science DMZ
model5,6 has been successfully implemented in numerous scenarios,
including those involving astrophysics, photon science, high-energy phys-
ics, materials science, climate modeling, and genomics.
We have taken a central tenet of the Science DMZ7,8 and re-
engineered it for sensitive data as a “Medical Science DMZ.” Science
DMZs operate at scale using already-provisioned software and authentica-
tion stacks as well as mature services at each site. Creating a high-capac-
ity, secure, data-intensive enclave within each research institution and at
major data repositories allows scientists across the country to securely
move data sets at scale to the appropriate computational resources based
on the trust relationships that govern each science collaboration. This pro-
vides the ability to compute on the data at scales previously reserved for
much larger physical sciences and engineering problems.
While HIPAA defines and mandates certain safeguards, it allows lati-
tude in addressing those safeguards. More importantly, it shifts the focus
to risk-centric, as opposed to control-centric, practices. To reflect this phi-
losophy, we define a “Medical Science DMZ” as a method or approach
that allows data flows at scale while simultaneously addressing the HIPAA
Security Rule and related regulations governing biomedical data.
Background
According to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
publication 800-41, firewalls are “devices or programs that control the
flow of network traffic between networks or hosts that employ differing
security postures.”9 NIST 800-41 defines multiple different types of
firewalls, including:
• Packet-filtering firewalls that use attributes of the packet head-
ers as the basis for their access control decisions.
• Stateful firewalls that track the connection state in the same
way the end hosts do, and are able to detect protocol-level
anomalies and other threats that a packet filter cannot.
• Application-layer firewalls that examine the contents of the
packets and messages and grant or deny access based on in-
ferred application state.
Commercial equipment providers have tended to only define state-
ful firewalls and application firewalls as “firewalls.” Despite this, the
standards body considered authoritative in matters of US government
policy (NIST) considers a packet-filtering router a firewall.
From the perspective of NIST 800-41, a Science DMZ uses a non-
stateful, packet-filter firewall implemented in the gateway, or a down-
stream router. In this model, a packet enters the firewall, its source and
destination addresses are compared to a list of rules, and the firewall
takes action (forward or discard) associated with the rule. Other compen-
sating controls, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) (e.g., the Bro
system10,11), are often employed. A capable Science DMZ firewall can
be configured to copy every packet it receives and send it to an IDS. The
IDS analyzes the packets and can take action to block hostile traffic.
MEDICAL SCIENCE DMZ ARCHITECTURES
1. Classical science DMZ
In a Science DMZ, a network enclave is constructed using high-
performance network routers at or near the institutional network perime-
ter. Because they are at the network perimeter, the resources in the
Science DMZ have ready high-performance access to the global R&E
network infrastructure and therefore have high-performance access to
the resources in other Science DMZs so long as security policies and
trust relationships permit such access. High-throughput servers called
Data Transfer Nodes (DTNs) are connected directly to these routers in
the Science DMZ. The DTNs handle all data ingest/export tasks for the
Science DMZ. The router to which the DTN is directly connected imple-
ments security controls for the DTN. The DTN typically also runs host-
based firewalls or IDS packages, and the set of applications running on
the DTN is strictly limited to system maintenance and data ingest/export
tasks. The limited number of applications on the DTN is a critical
point—it dramatically reduces the attack surface and makes the DTN a
better fit for risk-based security controls.
So designed, a Science DMZ is inherently resistant to a wide variety
of attacks. If data encryption is implemented, the data are not accessible
to adversaries that might snoop on the communication between Science
DMZs that share a trust relationship. The DMZ router controls which
DTNs exchange data, limiting opportunities for data exfiltration. The IDS
monitors for policy infractions and incoming hostile activity. All of this
can be done in a way that preserves the high-performance data transfer
capabilities necessary for effective collaboration in the era of Big Data. If
an IDS is employed, it can monitor DTN network traffic to ensure that the
policies on the DTN are being followed. This defense in depth is an im-
portant cross-check for DTN configuration changes, and is especially
powerful in operational environments where the IDS policies are not rou-
tinely modified at the same time as the DTN configuration.
The flexibility of the Science DMZ model allows for multiple suben-
claves within an institution, each with its own risk profile, security poli-
cies, compensating controls, and so forth. The following case studies
describe the addition of capabilities to the classical Science DMZ, en-
hancing it for use in environments with protected data.
2. Three medical science DMZ implementations
Indiana University (IU), Harvard University, and the University of
Chicago all implement Medical Science DMZs. Each one has imple-
mented frameworks that allow the free flow of data where needed and
address HIPAA using alternate controls that manage risk. To that end,
each organization has implemented a specific “risk-managed” techni-
cal DMZ solution that encompasses the entire high-performance
computing, storage, and network infrastructure.
IU has created a holistic environment called “SciPass”12 that lever-
ages a comprehensive, NIST-based risk management framework.13,14
SciPass12 is managed by the IU GlobalNOC.15 The SciPass system con-
tains 6 components: an OpenFlow Switch,16 the SciPass controller, a
cluster of IDS sensors, a PerfSONAR host,17 a firewall, and a DTN.
SciPass defines IDS policies to identify “good” flows. These policies
contain a combination of time of the day and day of the week, and
source and designation IP address, along with protocol and application
layer data to determine if a flow should bypass an institutional firewall.
Thus, users, network administrators, and security administrators are
able to jointly define and enforce desired network behavior.
By default, traffic is forwarded from the OpenFlow switch through
the institutional firewall, and copies of packets are sent to the array of
IDS sensors. When policies determine that it is appropriate to route an
individual flow around the firewall, a pair of OpenFlow rules are added
to the switch so that packets associated with this flow are directly for-
warded, bypassing the institutional firewall and the IDS array. These
rules contain an idle timeout so that once the flow is complete, the
rules are purged from the switch. The SciPass architecture allows ex-
ceptions for known high-performance data transfers. The flexibility of
the Science DMZ model allows for these enhancements, which signifi-
cantly reduce the attack surface for the DTNs.
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Harvard University’s approach begins with an individual signing a
Data Use Agreement. Dedicated systems inside a firewall, with dedi-
cated virtual private networking, are controlled by the users’
Organizational Unit. Individual machines are secured, logged, backed
up, monitored, and sandboxed from the main shared cluster. Data
sharing is enabled by leveraging encrypted virtual containers and net-
works. For data transfer, the data pass through a Secure Sockets
Layer appliance onto the private secured system via a dedicated en-
crypted tunnel. The virtual private network (VPN), user id, and 2-factor
authentication system enable access to the physical or virtual machine,
with a subsequent login to finally access that system.
The University of Chicago, in collaboration with the not-for-profit
Open Cloud Consortium, has developed and operated cloud-based
computing infrastructure and data commons known as “Bionimbus”
for the biomedical research community. Both of these support high-
performance data transport through the Science DMZ, tightly integrated
with the security services of the application.
Key architecture decisions include the notion that all network traffic
from outside the application to the computing and storage infrastruc-
ture passes through one or more heavily monitored “head nodes.” The
storage and computing nodes are not connected directly to the
Internet. Additionally, traffic containing sensitive or controlled access
data, including traffic using high-performance data transport protocols
through the Science DMZ, is encrypted.
SUMMARY
The national high-performance network infrastructure provides a scal-
able option for handling the biomedical data avalanche and the ensuing
computational workflows. We have defined a Medical Science DMZ as a
potential institutional approach to solving the security and regulatory is-
sues introduced by HIPAA. The Medical Science DMZ is able to transfer
data at high throughput by ensuring that endpoints are HIPAA-aligned,
implement a large number of baseline NIST 800-53 controls,13 and are
supplemented by enterprise common NIST controls,14 thus introducing
alternate controls that lower or mitigate the risk of data exposure due to
an absence of packet-filter firewalls. Finally, we have described several
production implementations where this architecture is already being de-
ployed to support research with sensitive data at scale.
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